君主论-the prince(英文版)-第1部分
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THE PRINCEby Nicolo MachiavelliWritten c。 1505; published 1515translated by W。 K。 MarriottCHAPTER IHOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE; AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY AREACQUIREDALL STATES; all powers; that have held and hold rule over men have beenand are either republics or principalities。Principalities are either hereditary; in which the family has been longestablished; or they are new。The new are either entirely new; as was Milan to Francesco Sforza; orthey are; as it were; members annexed to the hereditary state of theprince ; as was the kingdom of Naples to that ofthe King of Spain。Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under aprince; or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms ofthe prince himself; or of others; or else by fortune or by ability。CHAPTER IICONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIESI WILL leave out all discussion on republics; inasmuch as in anotherplace I have written of them at length; '1' and will address myself onlyto principalities。 In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above;and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved。I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states;and those long accustomed to the family of their prince; than new ones;for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of hisancestors; and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise; for aprince of average powers to maintain himself in his state; unless he bedeprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if heshould be so deprived of it; whenever anything sinister happens to theusurper; he will regain it。We have in Italy; for example; the Duke of Ferrara; who could not havewithstood the attacks of the Veians in '84; nor those of Pope Juliusin '10; unless he had been long established in his dominions。 For thehereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence ithappens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices causehim to be hated; it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will benaturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and durationof his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost; forone change always leaves the toothing for another。1。 Discourses。CHAPTER IIICONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIESBUT the difficulties occur in a new principality。 And firstly; if it benot entirely new; but is; as it were; a member of a state which; takencollectively; may be called posite; the changes arise chiefly from aninherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for menchange their rulers willingly; hoping to better themselves; and thishope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein theyare deceived; because they afterwards find by experience they have gonefrom bad to worse。 This follows also on another natural and monnecessity; which always causes a new prince to burden those who havesubmitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardshipswhich he must put upon his new acquisition。In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured inseizing that principality; and you are not able to keep those friendswho put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in theway they expected; and you cannot take strong measures against them;feeling bound to them。 For; although one may be very strong in armedforces; yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwillof the natives。For these reasons Louis XII; King of France; quickly occupied Milan; andas quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only neededLodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the gates to him;finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit; would notendure the ill…treatment of the new prince。 It is very true that; afteracquiring rebellious provinces a second time; they are not so lightlylost afterwards; because the prince; with little reluctance; takes theopportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents; to clear out thesuspects; and to strengthen himself in the weakest places。 Thus to causeFrance to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovicoto raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it asecond time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him; andthat his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy; whichfollowed from the causes above mentioned。Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the secondtime。 The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remainsto name those for the second; and to see what resources he had; and whatany one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself moresecurely in his acquisition than did the King of France。Now I say that those dominions which; when acquired; are added to anancient state by him ; are either of the same countryand language; or they are not。 When they are; it is easier to hold them;especially when they have not been accustomed to self…government; and tohold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of theprince who was ruling them; because the two peoples; preserving in otherthings the old conditions; and not being unlike in customs; will livequietly together; as one has seen in Brittany; Burgundy; Gascony; andNormandy; which have been bound to France for so long a time: and;although there may be some difference in language; nevertheless thecustoms are alike; and the people will easily be able to get on amongstthemselves。 He who has annexed them; if he wishes to hold them; has onlyto bear in mind two considerations: the one; that the family of theirformer lord is extinguished; the other; that neither their laws northeir taxes are altered; so that in a very short time they will beeentirely one body with the old principality。But when states are acquired in a country differing in language;customs; or laws; there are difficulties; and good fortune and greatenergy are needed to hold them; and one of the greatest and most realhelps would be that he should go and reside there。This would make his position more secure and durable; as it has madethat of the Turk in Greece; who; notwithstanding all the other measurestaken by him for holding that state; if he had not settled there; wouldnot have been able to keep it。 Because; if one is on the spot; disordersare seen as they spring up; and one can quickly remedy them; but if oneis not at hand; they heard of only when they are one can no longerremedy them。 Besides this; the country is not pillaged by yourofficials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince;thus; wishing to be good; they have more cause to love him; and wishingto be otherwise; to fear him。 He who would attack that state from theoutside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince residesthere it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty。The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places;which may be as keys to that state; for it necessary either to do thisor else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry。 A princedoes not spend much on colonies; for with little or no expense he cansend them out and keep them there; and he offends a minority only of thecitizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the newinhabitants; and those whom he offends; remaining poor and scattered;are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easilykept quiet; and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear itshould happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled。 Inconclusion; I say that these colonies are not costly; they are morefaithful; they injure less; and the injured; as has been said; beingpoor and scattered; cannot hurt。 Upon this; one has to remark that menought either to be well treated or crushed; because they can avengethemselves of lighter injuries; of more serious ones they cannot;therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such akind that one does not stand in fear of revenge。But in maintaining armed men